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Abstract
In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests,
but also on what each player considers as the correct thing to do. This work presents a game theoretic
model, aiming to describe game situations in which the players’ behavior is affected by ethical consider-
ations. Particularly, we assume that they partially follow, Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’. The model is
stated for games with a continuum of players. The basic assumption made is that the participants perceive
that they belong to virtual (imagined) groups, in which they optimize their actions as if they were bound
to follow the same strategy. A partially cooperative equilibrium, called r-Kant-Nash equilibrium is then
introduced. We then study the relationship of the r-Kant-Nash equilibrium with the Nash, (Bentham-)
Harsanyi, Rawls difference and Roemer solutions. For the case where the set of possible player types is
finite, we prove sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the r-Kant-Nash equilibrium
and the equilibrium is characterized in terms of a variational inequality. For the case of continuous
types, necessary conditions characterizing the partial Kantian equilibria are derived using a reduction
to a set of optimal control problems. Finally, some numerical examples are given.
I. INTRODUCTION
Equilibriua are often inefficient and thus the description of cooperative behaviors has arisen
as a major topic in Game Theory. In the context of repeated games there is a lot of work on the
imposition of cooperative outcomes, under the name ‘folk theorems’ (see for example [1]). In
the context of Evolutionary Game Theory, the evolution of cooperation is a very important topic
as well [2],[3]. There is also empirical evidence that people in small societies indeed cooperate,
for example when exploiting a common resource [4]. However, there is a multitude of different
cooperative outcomes which can be supported by fully rational players or evolutionary models.
This is an ongoing work.Any comments or references are very welcome.
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2Thus, an important question is ‘which one of those equilibrium solutions could describe or
predict the actual outcomes?’.
This work studies the behaviour of the players in game situations, in the case where their
behavior is affected by ethical considerations. Particularly we assume that they are partially
following Kant’s “categorical imperative” ([5]):
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it
should become a universal law.
Several issues may arise. First, the players may have different action sets, their actions may
have different impact to the others, or they may have different preferences. Hence, a “maxim”
is interpreted as a strategy of a player (i.e. a mapping from a state or type to the action set),
and not an action. Second, when a certain player optimizes for the strategy, which she assumes
that the others would also follow, it is not reasonable to assume that all the other players having
different states or preferences would cooperate to optimize the particular player’s cost1. In order
to overcome this difficulty, the notion of the veil of ignorance will be used ([6] under the name
equi-partition and [7]). Third, when a veil of ignorance is used the problem of interpersonal
comparison of utility arises. However, this is not an issue in a descriptive model, since what is
important is how each player perceives the utilities of the others and the players do not need to
agree on the scaling of the utilities of the other persons. Finally, the players know that it is not
true that all the others will follow their strategy. Hence, it is interesting to study how the players
would behave if each one of them assumes that some of the others would follow her strategy.
In [8], [9], [10], [11] the notion of the Kantian Equilibrium is introduced. A set of strategies
constitutes a Kantian Equilibrium if no player has a motivation to change her action assuming that
the rest of the players would change their actions accordingly (ex. multiplicatively or additively).
It turns out that under weak conditions the set of Kantian Equilibria coincides with the Pareto
frontier. However, the Kantian Equilibrium is status-quo dependent (and thus conservative) and
1Let us quote a part of a story in which Woody Allen makes fun of several philosophers.
“No less misguided was Kant, who proposed that we order lunch in such a manner that if everybody ordered the
same thing the world would function in a moral way. The problem Kant didnt foresee is that if everyone orders
the same dish there will be squabbling in the kitchen over who gets the last branzino. “Order like you are ordering
for every human being on earth,” Kant advises, but what if the man next to you doesnt eat guacamole? In the end,
of course, there are no moral foods-unless we count soft-boiled eggs.”
From Woody Allen “THUS ATE ZARATHUSTRA” New Yorker JULY 3, 2006
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3the players cannot determine their actions, without referring to the actions of the other players.
Furthermore, often Pareto frontier contains fundamentally unjust solutions. It is probably not
reasonable to expect that a player who is very much disadvantaged by a solution in the Pareto
frontier to be wiling to cooperate with the others, while she has the opportunity to improve her
position by changing unilaterally her action. The papers [12], [13], [14] and [15] extended [8]
in two distinct directions. First, they consider dynamic games and second study game situation
with mixed Kantian and Nash players and introduce the notions of (inclusive and exclusive)
Kant-Nash equilibria and virtual co-movers equilibrium. Another related line of research is the
theory of Belief Distorted Nash Equilibrium [16], [17].
In this work, we use a model with a continuum of players (see for example [18]) and introduce
the notions of r-Kant-Nash equilibrium and r, h-Kant-Nash equilibrium. we then investigate the
relations of these notions with several known concepts, including the Nash equilibrium, the
Harsanyi solution, the Rawls solution and the Roemer’s Kantian equilibrium. For the finite
number of types case, sufficient conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of an r-Kant-
Nash equilibrium are provided and the r-Kant-Nash equilibria are characterized in terms of
variational inequalities. For the infinite number of types case, we derive necessary conditions in
terms of the solution of appropriate optimal control problems. To illustrate the application of
the results, the fishing game example is used.
All the sets and functions thereafter are assumed to be measurable.
II. THE MODEL
There is a continuum of players, each one of which has an individual type xi ∈ X and a
social preference type θi ∈ Θ. The individual type describes both the preferences of a player
and the effects of her actions to the costs of the others (i.e. her position). The social preference
type will be explained in detail later on. Denote by D the set of possible individual type-social
type pairs i.e., D = X × Θ and by A a sigma algebra on D. Let us further denote by p the
distribution of the of the pairs (x, θ) on D.
Each player i chooses an action ui from an action set U . The cost function of each player is
given by:
Ji = J(ui, u¯, xi), (1)
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4where u¯ is statistic of the players’ actions:
u¯ =
∫
D
g(u(x, θ), x)dp, (2)
and by u(x, θ) we denote the action of a player with the an individual type-social type pair
(x, θ). That is, we focus in symmetric solutions, where all the players with a certain type pair
(x, θ) use the same action.
Let us then describe the idea of a virtual (imagined) group:
(i) Each player i assumes that she is associated with a virtual group of players. This group
reflects the social considerations of player i and it is constructed according to the social
preference type θi. This group is described by a sub-probability measure r(·, xi, θi) on
(D,A) i.e., a finite measure with r(D, xi, θi) ≤ 1. For every A ∈ A, the sub-probability
measure should satisfy r(A, xi, θi) ≤ p(A). If r(D, xi, θi) 6= 0, let us denote by r¯(·, xi, θi)
the probability measure r(·, xi, θi)/r(D, xi, θi). If r(D, xi, θi) = 0 then the virtual group of
the player constitutes only of herself.
(ii) Player i assumes that all the members of the virtual group are bound to use the same
strategy u = γxi,θi(x) = γ(x, xi, θi). That is, Player i assumes that all the players in her
group having individual type x will have an action γ(x, xi, θi).
(iii) The aim of the virtual group is to minimize the mean cost of its members. If r(D, xi, θi) > 0,
the virtual group of player i will have a cost:
J˜i(γ, γ¯) =
1
βθi
lnE {exp[βθiJ(γ(x′, xi, θi), u¯i, x′)wx,θi(x′)]} , (3)
where x′ is a random variable following the X marginal of r¯(·, xi, θi), the factor wθi is a
weighting function indicating the relative importance of the several positions in the group
and βθi ∈ [−∞,∞] is a risk factor. The value of u¯ corresponds to the g-mean value of the
actions of all the players assuming that the members of the group are using u = γ(x, xi, θi)
and the strategy of the players not belonging to the group is given by γ¯(x, θ). Thus,
u¯ = Txi,θi(γ, γ¯) =
∫
D
g(γ¯(x, θ), x)(p(d(x, θ))− r(d(x, θ), xi, θi))+
+
∫
D
g(γ(x, xi, θi), x)r(dx, xi, θi) (4)
If r(D, xi, θi) = 0, then the cost of the virtual group of player i coincides with the actual
cost given by (1). If for some θi, we have βθi = 0, then
J˜i(γ, γ¯) = E {J(γ(x′, xi, θi), u¯i, x′)wx,θi(x′))} . (5)
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5Remark 1:
(i) The virtual groups defined have some points in common with the virtual co-movers model
of [12]. Specifically in the virtual co-movers model each player assumes that if she changes
her strategy, a subset of the others would also change theirs accordingly.
(ii) The definition of the members of the virtual group of each player offers a lot of flexibility.
The two extreme cases are the case where r = 0 and the group of each player consists
only of herself and the case where r(·, x, θ) = p(·). In the intermediate cases the quantity
r(·, x, θ) may relate to some percieved social identity, such as race, class, religion, gender,
ethnicity, ideology, nationality, sexual orientation, culture or language2.
(iii) The virtual groups, the way they are defined, are purely imaginary. Thus, the fact that a
player i assumes that an other player j is included in her virtual group does not necessarily
imply that the virtual group of player j includes i.
(iv) It is probably useful to distinguish between the individual position and individual pref-
erences, both contained in x. In this case it is possible that within a virtual group the
players are allowed to use strategies depending only on their individual position and not
their individual preferences. In this case strategies of the form u = γ(y, xi, θi), where
y = h(x, xi, θi) will be considered.
The players do not necessarily agree on which part of the x variables of the other players
correspond to individual positions and which to individual preferences. Let us note that often
people tend to overestimate the effect of the character (preferences) of the other persons
and underestimate situational factors (position), a phenomenon known as the fundamental
attribution error [19]. However, the virtual group of each player belongs exclusively in her
perception (or imagination) and thus the function h is defined to depend on xi, θi.
Definition 1: A set of strategies u = γ¯(x, θ) is an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium if for each
(xi, θi) ∈ D a solution γ(x, xi, θi) of the optimization problem:
minimize
γ(·,xi,θi)
J˜i(γ, γ¯) (6)
satisfies γ(xi, xi, θi) = γ¯(xi, θi).
A possibly useful alternative is to define the r-Kant-Nash equilibrium assuming that the
optimization problems in the virtual groups are solved within the class of strategies of the
form u = γ(y, xi, θi).
2 From the identity politics article of Wikipedia
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6Definition 2: A set of strategies u = γ¯(x, θ) is an h,r-Kant-Nash equilibrium if for each
(xi, θi) ∈ D a solution γ(x, xi, θi) of :
minimize
γ(·,xi,θi)
1
βθi
lnE {exp[βθiJ(γ(h(x′, xi, θi), θi), u¯i, h(x′, xi, θi))wθi(x, x′))]} ,
subj. to u¯ = Txi,θi(γ(h(·, xi, θi), γ¯),
(7)
within the class of strategies of the form u = γ(y, xi, θi), satisfies γ(xi, xi, θi) = γ¯(xi, θi).
Remark 2: Let us comment on the role of the several components of the definitions.
(i) The weighting factor wxi,θi may have two discrete roles. At first, Player i may believe that
in her virtual group, some subgroup of players should be favored over the others. A second,
and probably more important, role is to resolve the so called interpersonal comparison
of utility problem i.e., that fact that the players may not agree on how to scale the utility
functions of other players.
(ii) The function h has also two possibly distinct roles. At first, player i probably cannot
understand or does not know the preference part of the states of the other players belonging
to her virtual group. Secondly, it is possible that Player i despite the fact that feels that she
belongs to a virtual group involving another player j, she does not want to optimize for a
certain preference of Player j that she believes as not good or important for the group.
III. SPECIAL CASES AND RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS
The notion of r-Kant-Nash equilibrium has several interesting special cases. In the first four
cases Θ is a singleton.
(i) The mean field Nash equilibrium. Assuming that r ≡ 0 and βθ = 0 each player uses her
best response to the actions of the other players. Hence, for these values the r-Kant-Nash
equilibrium coincides with the mean field Nash equilibrium.
(ii) The (Bentham-) Harsanyi solution. Assume that βθ = 0 and r(·, x, θ) = p(·). Then, each
player is risk neutral and optimizes for the mean cost (or equivalently the sum of the costs)
of all the players. This solution coincides with the solution proposed in [6].
(iii) The Rawls solution. Assume that βθ =∞ and r(·, x, θ) = p(·). In this case, all the players
minimize the cost function of the worse of participant i.e., they use the minimax rule. This
solution coincides with the Rawls difference solution [7].
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7(iv) Assume that βθ = −∞ and r(·, x, θ) = p(·). In this case, all the players minimize the cost
function of the better off participant. This optimization procedure makes sense when the
better off participant represents the others (for example the best athlete).
(v) Efficient cooperation within coalitions. Consider the coalitions C1, . . . , CN ⊂ D and as-
sume that Cj , j = 1, . . . , N is a partition of D. Further assume that the virtual groups are the
same with the coalitions. That is, for (xi, θi) ∈ Cj it holds r(A, xi, θi) = p(A∩Cj)/p(Cj).
Finally assume that wθi(x, x
′) = gθi(x
′). Then, within each coalition the players jointly
optimize for a weighted sum of their costs, and thus within each coalition there is an
efficient cooperation.
(iv) Simple Kantian optimization. The notion of simple Kantian optimization, defined in [9],
studies cases where each player optimizes for her own cost assuming that all the other
players would have exactly the same action with her. This is a limit case of the h, r-Kant-
Nash equilibrium assuming that r(·, x, θ) = p(·), the range of the function h is a singleton
and w(x, x′)→ δx(x′) where δ stands for the Dirac function.
(v) The relation with the altruistic (other regarding) behaviour is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 1 (The Fishing Game): There is a large number N of fishers each each of which
has a cost function:
Ji = u
2
i −
(
1− 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
uj
)
ui, (8)
where the first term corresponds to the effort of the fisher i and the second on the revenues.
The altruistic (other regarding) cost for player i is:
J¯i = (1− α/2)Ji + (α/2)
∑
j 6=i
Jj = (1− α/2)(u2i − ui) +
1
N − 1ui
∑
j 6=i
uj + f(u−i), (9)
with α ∈ [0, 1].
The Nash equilibrium of the altruistic game is given by:
ui =
2− α
6− 2α (10)
Let us then consider the partial Kantian strategy for the game with a continuum of players.
Assume that Θ = {θ} and X = {x} are singletons. Further assume that each player
considers as her virtual group a fraction α of the other players. Then, the r-Kant-Nash
equilibrium in the form u = γ is characterized by:
∂
∂γ
J(u, u¯) =
∂
∂u
J(u, u¯) +
∂
∂u¯
J(u, u¯)
∂u¯
∂γ
= 0, (11)
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8Fig. 1. Comparison of the actions and the Costs of the players when they use a partially Kantian vs an Altruistic criterion
Hence,
2u− 1 + u¯+ (1− α)u = 0. (12)
Due to symmetry:
u =
1
3 + α
. (13)
Figure 1 compares the actions and the costs of the players in the cases of an altruistic
versus a partially Kantian behaviour. It turns out that the Kantian cooperation is more
effective than the altruism. 
(vi) The relation with Roemer’s Kantian equilibrium is illustrated in the following example:
Example 2 (The Fishing Game: Continued): Consider again the Fishing Game example.
Assume also that in a previous iteration of the game (status quo) the players used actions
uprevi . Denote by xi the state of each player to be the action that she had in the status quo.
Let the actions of the game to be denoted by vi and relate to the original Fishing game with
ui = xivi. Then, assuming βθ = 0, r(·, x, θ) = p(·) and h(x, xi, θi) = xi an h, r-Kant-Nash
equilibrium of the game is a Roemer’s Kantian equilibrium. 
This analogy illustrates that the Kantian equilibrium is status quo dependent. Furthermore,
the choice of the multiplicative representation of the game is made such that the outcome
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9belongs to the Paretto frontier. Hence, Kantian equilibrium depends on the “experience”
in two distinctive ways i.e., the action changing rule and the status quo. Kant in his
Groundwork [5] strongly opposes to the use of “experience” in order to derive normative
rules. However, this fact in no case implies that people are not using their experience to
determine how to behave. What it probably means is that in Roemer’s work, experience
affects too much the behavior of the players, while in this work too little.
IV. FINITE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL TYPES
In this section, we assume that U is a subset of the m−dimensional Eucledian space and that D
is finite i.e., there is a finite set of possible individual-social type pairs (x1, θ1), . . . , (xN , θN). The
distribution of players is described by a vector p = [p1 . . . pN ]. For the case of a finite number
of types, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium and
characterize it in terms of a variational inequality. To do so, let us first introduce some notation.
Denote by N ′ the number of different values of xk’s and by x¯1, . . . , x¯N ′ their values. Denote
also by σ the function such that σ(k) = k′ if xk = x¯k′ . Consider the virtual group of a player,
having type k, and assume that this group has strategy γ. Denote by u˜k = [uk1, . . . , ukN ] the
(imagined) action vector for the members of the group, where ukk′ = γ(x′k, xk, θk). The form
of the strategy implies that ukk′ = ukk′′ if xk′ = xk′′ . Thus, the vector u˜k may be viewed as a
member of the set UN ′ . We will use also the notation rkk′ = r({(x′k, θ′k)}, xk, θk).
A vector of actions u? = [u?1, . . . , u
?
N ] is an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium if there there exists a
matrix u = [ukk′ ] such that, for every k, it holds u?k = ukk and the strategy u˜k = [uk1 . . . ukN ]
is optimal for the virtual group of a player with type k, under the constraint ukk′ = ukk′′ if
σ(k′) = σ(k′′). The cost of a virtual group with action vector u˜k, assuming that the others are
playing u?, is given by:
J˜k(u˜k, u
?) =
1
βθi
ln
N∑
k′=1
rkk′ exp[βθiwk(k
′)J¯k,k′(u˜k, u?)], (14)
where Ju?,k′(u˜k) is the cost that a player belonging to the virtual group having type k′ would
have if the players of the group were using u˜k and the rest u?. Thus, J¯k,k′(u˜k, u?) is given by:
J¯k,k′(u˜k, u
?) = J
(
u˜kk′ ,
N∑
k′′=1
[g(u?k′′ , xk′′)(pk′′ − rkk′′) + g(u˜kk′′ , xk′′)rkk′′ ], xk′
)
. (15)
The following proposition adapts some standard results for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
(e.g. [20]) to the case of r-kant-Nash equilibrium. Before stating the proposition let us recall
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the notions of quasi-convexity and pseudo-convexity [21]. A function f(u) defined on a convex
set U is quasi-convex if for any real number f¯ the set {u ∈ U : f(u) ≤ f¯} is convex. The
function f is pseudo-convex if it is differentiable and for any pair of points u1, u2 ∈ U such that
∇f(u1)T (u2 − u1) ≥ 0 it holds f(u2) ≥ f(u1).
Proposition 1: Assume that U ⊂ Rm is compact and convex, that J˜k given by (14) is
continuous, and that J˜k(·, u?) is quasi-convex and for every fixed u? and every k. Then, there
exists an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Consider the set U¯ = UN×N ′ . For each type k consider the correspondence Tk : U¯ ⇒ UN
′
defined as follows. For a given a u ∈ U¯ , define u? = [u1σ(1) . . . uNσ(N)]. Then define:
Tk(u) = piUN′
[
arg min
u˜k∈Z
J˜k(u˜k, u
?)
]
,
where piUN′ denotes the projection to U
N ′ and Z = {u˜ ∈ UN : u˜k′ = u˜k′′ whenever xk′ =
xk′′}. Maximum theorem [22] implies that Tk is compact valued upper semi-continuous. Quasi-
convexity implies that Tk is convex valued. Thus, the correspondence T : U¯ ⇒ U¯ with T : u 7→
T1(u) × · · · × TN(u) satisfies the conditions of Kakutani fixed point theorem. Therefore, there
exists an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium. 
A very simple sufficient condition for the existence of a Kant-Nash equilibrium is given in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Assume that U ⊂ Rm is compact and convex, and J(·, ·, x) is convex for every
fixed x, the function g is linear in u and βθk ≥ 0, for all k. Then there exists an r-Kant-Nash
equilibrium.
Proof : The function J¯k,k′(·, u?) defined in (15) is convex with respect to u˜k. Indeed in the right
hand side of (15), the first two arguments of J , particularly
∑N
k′′=1[g(u
?
k′′ , xk′′)(pk′′ − rkk′′) +
g(ukk′′ , xk′′)rkk′′ ] and u˜kk′ are affine functions of u˜k. Thus, convexity of J implies that Ju?k′ is
convex. Now, the fact that exp(·) is increasing and convex implies that the function:
N∑
k′=1
rkk′ exp[βθiJu?,k′(u˜k))],
is convex in u˜k as well. Now, βθk ≥ 0 and the fact that the function ln(·) is increasing, imply
that the quasi-convexity assumption of Proposition 1 is satisfied and the proof of the corollary
is complete. 
If the quasi-convexity assumption is strengthened to a pseudo-convexity, then the r-Kant-Nash
equilibrium can be characterized by a variational inequality.
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Proposition 2: Assume that U ⊂ Rm is convex, that J˜k given by (14) is continuous, and that
J˜k(·, u?) is pseudo-convex and for every fixed u? and every k. Consider also the vector function
F : UN
2+N → RmN2+mN given by:
F (u˜, u?) =

∇u˜1 J˜1(u˜1, u?)T
...
∇u˜N J˜1(u˜N , u?)T
u?1 − u˜11
...
u?N − u˜NN

(16)
Then:
(i) There is an r-Kant Nash equilibrium if and only if there is a solution to the variational
inequality:
F (u˜, u?)T
 u˜′ − u˜,
(u?)′ − u?
 ≥ 0, for all u˜′ ∈ UN2 , (u?)′ ∈ UN (17)
(ii) Assume that F is strictly monotone i.e.:
(F (u˜′, (u?)′)− F (u˜, u?))T
 u˜′ − u˜,
(u?)′ − u?
 > 0, (18)
for every pair (u˜, u?), (u˜′, (u?)′). Then, there is at most one r-Kant Nash equilibrium.
Proof : (i) Consider a pair (u˜, u?) satisfying (17). Choosing u˜′ = u˜ and (u?2)
′ = u?2, . . . , (u
?
N)
′ =
u?N we conclude that u
?
1 = u˜11. Similarly, u
?
k = u˜kk for all k. Choosing u˜
′
i = u˜i for k =
1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, . . . , N we conclude that u˜k is optimal in (14). Thus, (u˜, u?) corresponds to
an r-Kant Nash equilibrium. (ii) It is a direct consequence of part (i) and Theorem 2.3.3 of [23].

V. INFINITE NUMBER OF TYPES
A. Reformulation as Optimal Control Problems
In this section we characterize r-Kant-Nash equilibria under the assumption that Θ is a
singleton, X = [0, Tf ], β = 0, and that all the measures are absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure.
Assuming that the players that do not belong to i’s virtual group follow a strategy uj = γ¯(xj),
the optimization problem (3) is written as:
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min.
γ
{∫ Tf
0
J
(
γ(x′), u¯−xi +
∫ Tf
0
g(γ(z), z)r(z, xi)dz, x
′
)
w(xi, x
′)r(x′, xi)dx′
}
, (19)
where,
u¯−xi =
∫ Tf
0
g(γ¯(z), z)(p(z)− r(z, xi))dz, (20)
and (with a slight abuse of notation) r denotes the density of the measure r(·, xi) with respect
to the Lebesgue measure.
The optimization problem (19), assuming u¯−xi as given, can be reformulated as an optimal
control problem using the state x′ as a virtual time.
Proposition 3: The optimization problem (19) is equivalent to the optimal control problem:
minimize
uxi (t)
∫ Tf
0
Lxi(uxi , u¯−xi + χxi2 , t)dt
subject to χ˙xi1 = g(u
xi , t)r(t, xi), χ1(0) = 0
χ˙xi2 = 0, χ
xi
2 (0) : free
χxi1 (Tf ) = χ
xi
2 (Tf ),
(21)
where
Lxi(u, v, t) = J (u, v, t)w(xi, t)r(t, xi)
Proof: Observe that
∫ Tf
0
g(uxi , t)r(t, xi)dt = χ
xi
1 (Tf ) = χ2(Tf ) = χ2(t). 
Necessary conditions can be derived using Pontryagin minimum principle (e.g. [24]). It turns
out that the problem has a special structure and the optimal control law is characterized by a
pair of algebraic equations instead of a two point boundary value problem. The Hamiltonian is
given by:
Hxi = Lxi(uxi , u¯−xi + χxi2 , t) + p
xi
1 g(u
xi , t)r(t, xi). (22)
The costate equations are given by:
p˙xi1 = 0, p˙
xi
2 = −
∂Lxi
∂v
(uxi , u¯−xi + χxi2 , t) (23)
(where v is the second argument of Lxi) and the boundary conditions by:
pxi2 (0) = 0, p
xi
1 (Tf ) + p
xi
2 (Tf ) = 0. (24)
Let us assume that there is a unique minimizer uxi = l(t, χ2, p1, u¯−xi , xi) of Hxi with respect
to uxi . In order to characterize the optimal controller it remains to determine the constants pxi1
and χxi2 . A pair of algebraic equations will be derived.
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Combining p˙xi1 = 0, p
xi
2 (0) = 0 and p
xi
1 (Tf ) = −pxi2 (Tf ) we get:
pxi1 = −pxi2 (Tf ) =
∫ Tf
0
∂Lxi(l(t, χxi2 , p
xi
1 , u¯
−xi , xi), χ
xi
2 + u¯
−xi , t)
∂v
dt (25)
The right hand side of (25) is a known function of χxi2 , p
xi
1 and u¯
−xi .
The second algebraic equation is obtained combining χ˙xi2 = 0, χ
xi
1 (0) = 0 and χ
xi
1 (Tf ) =
χxi2 (Tf ):
χxi2 =
∫ Tf
0
g(l(t, χxi2 , p
xi
1 , u¯
−xi , t, xi)r(t, xi)dt, (26)
where the right hand side of (26) is again a known function of χxi2 , p
xi
1 and u¯
−xi .
Proposition 4: Assume that γ¯(x) is an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium. Further assume that there
is a unique minimizer l of Hxi for any xi ∈ X . Then, there exist functions χ·2 : X → R,
p·1 : X → R and u¯−· : X → R satisfying, (25), (26) and:
u¯−xi =
∫ Tf
0
g((l(t, χt2, p
t
1, u¯
−t, xi), t)(p(t)− r(t, xi))dt, (27)
such that γ¯(xi) = l(xi, χ2, p1, u¯−xi , xi) for any xi ∈ X .
Proof: Immediate. 
Thus, an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium is characterized by a couple of algebraic equations and an
integral equation.
B. Equilibrium in a Quadratic Game
Let us consider again the Fishing Game example assuming players with different efficiencies
(for example a fisher is more experienced than another or he has a better boat). We assume that
Θ is a singleton, X = [0, 1] and the players have a uniform distribution. The cost function for
each player is given by:
Ji = u
2
i − (1− u¯)ξ(xi)ui, (28)
where:
u¯ =
∫ 1
0
u(x)ξ(x)dx (29)
and ξ(x) > 0 is the efficiency of a player with state x.
We shall compute the r-Kant-Nash equilibrium assuming that r(x′, x) = 0 implies w(x′, x) =
0, that is if a player with state x considers a player another player with state x′ to belong to his
virtual group, he does not assign him a zero weight.
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In this example, the optimal control problems are LQ and thus the minimum principle neces-
sary conditions are also sufficient. The Hamiltonian is given by:
Hxi =
[
u2 − (1− u¯−xi − χxi2 )ξ(t)u
]
w(t, xi)r(t, xi) + p
xi
1 ξ(t)r(t, xi)u (30)
The optimal control u is given by:
u = l(t, χxi2 , p
xi
1 , u
−xi) =
1
2
(1− u¯−xi − χxi2 − pxi1 /w(t, xi))ξ(t) (31)
Equation (26) is written as:
χxi2 =
1
2
∫ 1
0
(1− u¯−xi − χxi2 − pxi1 /w(t, xi))ξ2(t)r(t, xi)dt (32)
or:
χxi2 =
(1− u¯−xi)Cxi1 − p1Cxi2
2 + Cxi1
(33)
where:
Cxi1 =
∫ 1
0
ξ2(t)r(t, xi)dt and Cxi2 =
∫ 1
0
ξ2(t)r(t, xi)/w(t, xi)dt (34)
Equation (25) is written as:
pxi1 =
1
2
∫ 1
0
((1− u¯−xi − χxi2 )w(t, xi)− p1)ξ2(t)r(t, xi)dt. (35)
Equivalently:
2pxi1 = (1− u¯−xi)Cxi3 − χxi2 Cxi3 − pxi1 Cxi1 , (36)
where:
Cxi3 =
∫ 1
0
ξ2(t)r(t, xi)w(t, xi)dt. (37)
Solving (33), (36) for χxi2 , p
xi
1 we obtain:
χxi2 =
(Cxi1 )
2 + 2Cxi1 − Cxi2 Cxi3
(Cxi1 )
2 + 2Cxi1 − Cxi2 Cxi3 + 4
(1− u¯−xi), (38)
pxi1 =
2Cxi3
(Cxi1 )
2 + 2Cxi1 − Cxi2 Cxi3 + 4
(1− u¯−xi). (39)
In what follows, in order to simplify the computations we assume that w(x, x′) = 1. Under
this assumption, it holds Cxi1 = C
xi
2 = C
xi
3 = C(xi) and:
χxi2 = p
xi
1 =
C(xi)
2C(xi) + 2
(1− u¯−xi). (40)
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Furthermore,
uxi(t) =
1
2
(1− u¯−xi) ξ(t)
C(xi) + 1
. (41)
Equation (27) becomes:
u¯−xi =
∫ 1
0
1
2
(1− u¯−t) ξ
2(t)
C(t) + 1
(1− r(t, xi))dt, (42)
which is a linear Fredholm integral equation of second kind.
Example 3: In this example we assume that r(x, x′) = α (a uniform (sub)-distribution).
Equation (42) implies that u¯−xi is independent of xi. Thus, denoting by u¯− this constant we
obtain:
u¯− = (1− u¯−)1− α
2
∫ 1
0
ξ2(t)
C(t) + 1
dt. (43)
Thus,
uxi(xi) =
1
2 + (1− α) ∫ 1
0
ξ2(t)
C(t)+1
dt
ξ(xi)
C(xi) + 1
. (44)
Hence, the actions of the players scale down uniformly as α increases. 
Example 4: In this example we assume that:
r(x, x′) =
α if |x− x
′| ≤ 0.3 and x ≤ 0.9
0 otherwise
(45)
The solution of the integral equation (42) can be approximated using a linear system with a
high order. The actions of the players, as well as the cost for the participants of the game are
illustrated in figures 2,3.

VI. AN EXAMPLE OF AN h, r-KANT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We consider again the Fishing Game example involving players with different efficiencies
who value differently their time. Assume that X = {1, 2} × {1, 2} and that:
Ji = x
2
iu
2
i − (1− u¯)x1i (xi)ui, (46)
where x1i is the efficiency of Player i and x
2
i determines how much Player i values her working
time. Further, assume that p(1, 1) = p1 = 0.1, p(1, 2) = p2 = 0.2, p(2, 1) = p3 = 0.3 and
p(2, 2) = p4 = 0.4.
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Fig. 2. The actions of the several players for different values of α
Fig. 3. The cost for the several players for different values of α
In this section, we shall compare the r-Kant-Nash equilibrium with the h, r−Kant-Nash
equilibrium, assuming that there is only a single type of social preferences θ and that r(·, x, θ)
is a uniform sub-probability measure with total mass α.
Example 5 (The r-Kant-Nash equilibrium): In order to derive the equations characterizing a
set of strategies γ(1, 1) = uKN1 , γ(1, 2) = u
KN
2 , γ(2, 1) = u
KN
3 , γ(2, 2) = u
KN
4 constituting an
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r-Kant-Nash equilibrium, consider the cost of the virtual group of player i:
J˜i = p1u
2
1 + 2p2u
2
2 + p3u
2
3 + 2p4u
2
4 −
[
1− α(p1u1 + p2u2 + 2p3u3 + 2p4u4)−
− (1− α)(p1uKN1 + p2uKN2 + 2p3uKN3 + 2p4uKN4 )
]·
· (p1u1 + p2u2 + 2p3u3 + 2p4u4),
or in compact form:
J˜i = u
T (S + αllT )u− (1− (1− α)lTuKN)lTu, (47)
where S = diag(p1, 2p2, p3, 2p4), l = [p1, p2, 2p3, 2p4]T , uKN = [uKN1 , u
KN
2 , u
KN
3 , u
KN
4 ]
T and
u = [u1, u2, u3, u4]
T . A set of strategies uKN is an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium if the uKN minimizes
(47) with respect to u. Equivalently, uKN is an r-Kant-Nash equilibrium if:
(S + αllT )uKN =
1
2
(1− (1− α)lTuKN)l (48)
After straightforward calculations we get:
uKN = (2S + (1 + α)llT )−1l (49)
The actions of the players and the costs are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. 
Example 6 (The h, r-Kant-Nash equilibrium): Consider then the function h : X × X → X
with h((x′1, x′2), (x1, x2)) = (x′1, x2). That is, each player acts as is a potion α of the other
players would follow her strategy taking into account the effectiveness of the actions of the
others but not how they value their time3.
Let us then characterize an h, r-Kant Nash equilibrium uKN . There are two kinds of virtual
groups. The virtual group of a player with x2i = 1 has cost:
J˜i =p1(u
t1
1 )
2 + p2(u
t1
2 )
2 + p3(u
t1
3 )
2 + p4(u
t1
4 )
2 − [1− α(p1ut11 + p2ut12 + 2p3ut13 +
+ 2p4u
t1
4 )− (1− α)(p1uKN1 + p2uKN2 + 2p3uKN3 + 2p4uKN4 )]·
· (p1ut11 + p2ut12 + 2p3ut13 + 2p4ut14 ),
3 For example a player of type (2, 1) i.e., an efficient player how has a small value for her working time, may accept not to
overfish because she doesn’t want also the others to overfish taking into account the efficiency of the others. However, she may
not be wiling to take into account that some of the other fishers value more their working time. That is, she may not be wiling
to reduce her effort because some of the others are“lazy”.
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where ut11 − ut14 are the actions γ((1, 1), xi), γ((1, 2), xi), γ((2, 1), xi), γ((2, 2), xi) in the virtual
group of a player having x2i = 1. In compact form:
J˜i = (u
t1)T (S1 + αll
T )ut1 − (1− (1− α)lTuKN)lTut1, (50)
where S1 = diag(p1, p2, p3, p4), l = [p1, p2, 2p3, 2p4]T , uKN = [uKN1 , u
KN
2 , u
KN
3 , u
KN
4 ]
T and
ut1 = [ut11 , u
t1
2 , u
t1
3 , u
t1
4 ]
T . Similarly, the virtual group of a player with x2i = 2 has cost:
J˜i = (u
t2)T (S2 + αll
T )ut2 − (1− (1− α)lTuKN)lTut2, (51)
where S2 = 2diag(p1, p2, p3, p4) and ut2 = [ut21 , u
t2
2 , u
t2
3 , u
t2
4 ]
T .
The values for ut1 and ut2 which minimize (50) and (51) respectively satisfy the following
equations:
2(S1 + αll
T )ut1 + (1− α)llTuKN = l,
2(S2 + αll
T )ut2 + (1− α)llTuKN = l,
Coupled with the consistency conditions uKN1 = u
t1
1 , u
KN
3 = u
t1
3 and u
KN
2 = u
t2
2 , u
KN
4 = u
t2
4 ,
the h, r−Kant-Nash equilibrium is characterized by:
2(S1 + αll
T ) 0 (1− α)llT
0 2(S2 + αll
T ) (1− α)llT
diag(1, 0, 1, 0) diag(0, 1, 0, 1) −I4


ut1
ut2
uKN
 =

l
l
0
 (52)
The actions of the players and the costs are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The notions of r−Kant-Nash equilibrium and h, r-Kant-Nash equilibrium were introduced
and compared with other notions. Necessary conditions, based on a reduction to a set of optimal
control problems, can be derived for cases of games where the possible states admit an 1-
dimensional representation. Some examples of quadratic games with a finite number of types
was analyzed and r-Kant-Nash and h, r−Kant-Nash equilibria were computed using systems of
linear equations.
A possible extension of this work is to study games with a finite number of players. In this
case we may assume that the virtual group of each player is stochastic and that each player
determines her action before she learns the realization of her virtual group. Another direction
for future research is to extend the current model to Dynamic Games.
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Fig. 4. The cost of the players of several types for the cases of r-Kant-Nash and h, r-Kant-Nash equilibria
Fig. 5. The actions of the players of several types for the cases of r-Kant-Nash and h, r-Kant-Nash equilibria
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